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posite pattern emerges when it comes to the impact ofGrowth1. Introduction
How does ethnolinguistic diversity affect political and economic
outcomes? In recent years, a vast literature has argued that such
cultural heterogeneity impacts a wide range of outcomes, fostering
civil war, undermining growth, hindering redistribution and the
provision of public goods. However, evidence on this point remains
subject to some disagreement. For instance, there is a vibrant debate
on the role of ethnolinguistic divisions as determinants of civilwars.1 Econometric results on growth, redistribution and public
goods provision also vary widely across studies, raising issues of
robustness.2
These inconclusive results may stem in part from the inability to
convincingly define the ethnolinguistic groups used as primitives to
construct measures of heterogeneity. When faced with the issue of
how to define groups, researchers have either relied on readily
available classifications, such as the ones based on the Atlas Narodov
Mira or the Encyclopedia Britannica, or have carefully constructed their
own classifications.3 Both approaches are problematic: the former(2003) show that ethnic fractionalization is not an important
nset of civil wars. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), in
nic polarization is a significant determinant of the incidence of
3) argue that while ethnic and linguistic fractionalization are
ed to growth and the quality of government, the significance of
ns is sensitive to the specification.
iscussion of the difficulties raised by the issue of defining
thnolinguistic groups, see Alesina and La Ferrara (2005),
.
1
runs the risk of missing the relevant cleavages, whereas the latter is to growth, an outcome related to the ease of coordination. For
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nesubject to the criticism that groups are defined based on how
important they are expected to be for the problem at hand. In this
paper, we propose a methodology that addresses both criticisms, and
argue that the degree of coarseness of ethnolinguistic classifications
has profound implications for inference on the role of diversity.
The methodology we propose computes diversity measures at
different levels of aggregation. We do so by exploiting the information
of language trees. We refer to this as a phylogenetic approach, since
tree diagrams describe the family structure of world languages.
Depending on how finely or coarsely groups are defined, the measure
of linguistic diversity will be different. For example, if one takes the
different dialects of Italian to constitute different groups, then Italy
appears to be very diverse. However, if one considers these different
dialects to be only minor variations of Italian, then Italy looks
homogeneous. Apart from allowing us to classify languages at
different levels of aggregation, this approach has the advantage of
giving a historical dimension to our analysis. Coarse linguistic
divisions, obtained at high levels of aggregation, describe cleavages
that go back thousands of years. In contrast, finer divisions, obtained
at low levels of aggregation, are the result of more recent cleavages.
Since we rely on data that cover the entire set of 6912 world
languages, and examine effects of heterogeneity measures computed
at all possible levels of aggregation, we are able to capture a wide
range of linguistic classifications. Rather than choosing the “correct”
classification ourselves, we let the data inform us as to which
linguistic cleavages are most relevant for different outcomes of
interest.4
Our empirical analysis reveals drastically different effects of
linguistic diversity at different levels of aggregation. We also find
that the relevant cleavages vary greatly across political economy
outcomes. Starting from the data, specifications and estimation
methods from major contributions to the literature on the political
economy of ethnolinguistic diversity, we substitute our newmeasures
of diversity for those commonly used. For civil conflict and the extent
of redistribution, issues that inherently involve conflicts of interest,
coarse divisions seem to matter most. While we find only weak
evidence that diversity (whether measured by fractionalization or
polarization) affects the onset of civil wars at any level of linguistic
aggregation, the estimated effects do tend to be larger and more
significant when considering a coarse classification. This finding is
consistent with existing conflicts in African countries, such as Chad
and Sudan, on the border between the Afro Asiatic family and the
Nilo Saharan family. It may also help explain conflict in certain Latin
American countries, such as Mexico and Bolivia, where the Indo
European family coexists with different Amerindian languages. For
redistribution, the results are more robust, and suggest once again
that measures based on a high level of aggregation matter most. In
contrast, for economic growth, where coordination between indivi
duals or groups is essential and market integration is important, we
find that finer divisions lead to heterogeneity measures that matter
more. The same pattern holds across a wide array of measures of
public goods provision.
Thus, when the main issue involves conflicts of interest (as for the
onset of civil wars and the extent of redistribution), deep differences
originating thousands of years ago matter most: different groups'
interests differ more when cleavages are more deeply rooted. In
contrast, more superficial and recent divisions are negatively related
4 Our approach is related to existing work arguing that people identify with
different groups in different contexts (particularly the work of Crawford Young on
situational identity — see Young, 1976). For instance, ethnolinguistic cleavages that
matter for voting behavior in local elections may differ from those that matter for
national elections. For a related point, see Posner's, 2005 book on ethnic politics in
Zambia. More generally, cleavages that matter for some outcomes may not matter for
others. There is no such thing as a “correct” classification of languages or ethnicities —
this depends on the context.
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clastance, to the extent that clusters of economic activity form around
nguage lines, linguistic divisions may limit the integration of
arkets, and prevent economic growth. Even though Hindi and
ujarati are not so different, this linguistic cleavage may hinder the
tegration of the corresponding regions of India. What matters here
whether two individuals or groups can interact effectively. In fact,
er linguistic classifications deliver heterogeneity measures that
atter more for outcomes such as economic growth, which is
ndered by lack of coordination and integration. As for public
ods, they fall somewhere in between both cases: although they
ve a redistributive aspect, their effective provision also requires
ordination between groups or individuals. Empirically, we find that
e linguistic divisions, based on more superficial cleavages, are
rrelated with lower public goods provision across a wide array of
dicators.
This paper is related to a vast literature in political economy.
arious authors have studied how ethnolinguistic diversity affects
distribution, growth and civil conflict (Alesina and La Ferrara,
05; Alesina et al., 1999, 2003; Easterly and Levine, 1997; Fearon
d Laitin, 2003; La Porta et al., 1999, among many others).
easurement issues are central to recent research on these topics.
ne issue is that standard indices of diversity do not take into account
e distance between groups (Desmet et al., 2009; Fearon, 2003;
olaore and Wacziarg, 2009). Another possibility is that for certain
sues, such as civil conflict, polarization may be more relevant than
actionalization (Esteban and Ray, 1994; Montalvo and Reynal
uerol, 2005), an issue we revisit below. A third problem is the
fficulty of determining the right level of aggregation when
mputing heterogeneity measures, i.e., identifying the relevant
hnolinguistic cleavages. This issue has received little attention, and
is the main focus of the present study.5
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes conceptual
sues related to the measurement of heterogeneity based on
nguage trees, and describes the data. Section 3 discusses the effects
diversity on civil conflict and redistribution. Section 4 covers the
fects on public goods provision and economic growth. Section 5
plores a number of robustness issues, and Section 6 concludes.
Aggregation and linguistic diversity1. A tale of two countries
To illustrate our approach, we start with a comparative case study.
ver the period 1965 2000, Chad andZambia experienced someof the
west growth rates on the globe, their income per capita shrinking by
average of 1 percentage point per year (Table 1). The 2005 Human
evelopment Index ranked Chad 170 and Zambia 165 out of a total of
7 countries. It has long been argued that low growthmay be related
high ethnolinguistic diversity. With 135 languages spoken in Chad,
d between 40 and 70 in Zambia, these countries certainly are very
verse: taking the commonly used fractionalization index as a
easure of diversity, the Ethnologue database on languages gives a
lue of 0.95 for Chad and 0.85 for Zambia, putting both countries in
e top decile. As highlighted by Easterly and Levine (1997), data for a
oad cross section of countries point more formally to a general
gative relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and economic
5 Fearon (2003) does discuss at length the issue of how to define the “right list” of
hnic groups serving as the basis for computing heterogeneity measures, and
cognizes explicitly that not all cleavages may be relevant for a given outcome.
wever, he presents data on ethnic groups based on a single classification. Scarritt
d Mozaffar (1999) present data on ethnic groups for Sub-Saharan countries using
ree different classifications, but do not examine the effects of using these different
ssifications on political and economic outcomes.
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performance. In our data, the 10% most diverse countries had an
the case of Sri Lanka and Altaic in Afghanistan. In this case, we would
2.2. Language trees and linguistic diversity
polarization, but to the issue of aggregation. As Table 1 reveals, using a standard
measure of polarization instead of fractionalization leads to the same conclusion: the
difference in polarization between Zambia and Chad is much more pronounced for
highly aggregated linguistic classifications than for disaggregated ones. Correspond-
ingly, conflict and war has been continuous in Chad, but absent in Zambia. We discuss
the important issue of how the distinction between polarization and fractionalization
(which has to do with the functional form used to calculate measures of diversity)
relates to the level aggregation (which has to do with the definition of relevant
groups) in Section 2.3.
7 This point was recognized going at least as far back as Charles Darwin, who wrote:
“If we possessed a perfect pedigree of the mankind, a genealogical arrangement of the
races of man would afford the best classification of the various languages now spoken
throughout the world; and if all extinct languages, and all intermediate and slowly
changing dialects, were to be included, such an arrangement would be the only
possible one. Yet it might be that some ancient language had altered very little and had
given rise to few new languages, whilst others had altered much owing to the
spreading, isolation, and state of civilization of the several co-descended races, and had
thus given rise to many new dialects and languages. The various degrees of difference
between the languages of the same stock, would have to be expressed by groups
subordinate to groups; but the proper or even the only possible arrangement would
still be genealogical; and this would be strictly natural, as it would connect together all
languages, extinct and recent, by the closest affinities, and would give the filiation and
origin of each tongue.” (Darwin, 1902, p. 380).
Table 1
Growth, conflict, redistribution and linguistic diversity in Chad and Zambia.
Chad Zambia
Per capita growth 1960–1990 (Easterly-Levine),% 1% 1%
Per capita growth 1965–2000 (PWT 6.2),% 1% 1%
Years of civil war 1965–1999 35 0
Redistribution as % of GDP, 1985–1995 0.9% 3.8%
ELF (most disaggregated level) 0.95 0.85
ELF (at the aggregated level of language families) 0.55 0.01
Polarization (most disaggregated level) 0.18 0.43
Polarization (at the aggregated level of language families) 0.89 0.02
3average per capita growth rate of a meager 0.54% over the period
1960 2004, whereas the 10% least diverse countries posted a much
more sturdyfigure of 2.59% (linguistic diversity here ismeasured using
the most disaggregated classification of languages).
In spite of their high ethnolinguistic fractionalization, in terms of
conflict and civil war Chad and Zambia have been at opposite sides of
the spectrum. Chad has been at war almost continuously since
independence, whereas Zambia has not witnessed any civil conflict
worth speaking of. In Chad, during colonization, and after indepen
dence in 1960, the Christian South was privileged, and formed the
political elite, to the detriment of the Islamic and partly Arab speaking
North. Dissatisfaction by the North led to a civil war, which started in
1965, and lasted for about a decade and a half, culminating in the
rebels taking over the capital and ending Southern dominance. Since
then the country has remained unstable, partly because of the
inverted power relation, with the North now dominating the South,
but also because of power struggles within these regions. In recent
years, for example, there has been increasing ethnic tension between
the Zaghawa and Tama, two non Arab groups. Zambia, in contrast, has
had a history of peaceful coexistence between the many groups and
tribes. Although voting behavior in Zambia tends to run along
language groups (Posner, 2003), it has not led to the violence seen
in countries such as Chad. Income redistribution, which is an issue
involving divergence of interests, is often interpreted as related to
conflict. Data on redistribution confirm the contrast between both
countries: figures on transfers and subsidies as a share of GDP reveal
that on average between 1985 and 1995 Chad redistributed 0.9% of
GDP, compared to 3.8% in Zambia.
This example illustrates the main point of this paper: although
commonly used measures of diversity make Chad and Zambia look
very similar, those measures mask one important difference
between these countries in terms of diversity. Of the total population
in Chad, one third speaks an Afro Asiatic language, a little over half a
Nilo Saharan language, and the rest a language of the Niger Congo
family. In contrast, in Zambia, 99.5% of the population speaks a
language from the Niger Congo family. This raises an important
point: whereas Chad and Zambia are amongst the most diverse
countries on the globe, when considering language families rather
than individual languages, we obtain a very different picture. While
Chad continues to be one of the most diverse countries, ranking 7 out
of 225, Zambia now looks very homogeneous, ranking 176 out of
225, similar to Portugal. In other words, when taking every language
as being different, Zambia is very diverse, similar to Chad, whereas
when aggregating into language families, Zambia no longer appears
to be quite so heterogeneous.
In the example of Chad and Zambia, both countries are very diverse
at low levels of aggregation, but only Chad continues to be very diverse
at high levels of aggregation. It may be useful to consider an example
that goes in the other direction. Afghanistan has about 50 languages,
whereas Sri Lanka only 7, making Afghanistan relatively much more
diverse at low levels of aggregation. However, at high levels of
aggregation both countries are similar: 80% of their populations speak
an Indo European language, with a 20%minority of mostly Dravidian inexpect both countries to exhibit similar levels of conflict, but Sri Lanka
should outperform Afghanistan in terms of economic growth. Consis
tent with this prediction, between 1948 and 1999 Afghanistan
experienced civil conflict for 22 years and Sri Lanka for 18 years. In
contrast, annual growth in real GDP per capita between 1970 and 2000
was−4% in Afghanistan, and +4% in Sri Lanka.
The experience of these different country pairs suggests that the
type of diversity that matters for economic growth is different from
the type of diversity that matters for civil conflict and redistribution.
The essential difference between the two types of diversity is the
degree of aggregation. The relevant degree of aggregation, and thus
the relevant definition of a group, depends on the problem at hand.
This case study suggests that, for economic growth, fine differences
between languages may matter, whereas for civil conflict and
redistribution, only coarse differences may play a role as is
confirmed below in large samples.62.2.1. The construction of language trees
This paper seeks to measure linguistic diversity at different levels
of aggregation. To do so, we use language trees. We refer to this as a
phylogenetic approach (as the linguistics literature does), referring to
the fact that tree diagrams capture the genealogy of languages,
classified in terms of their family structure.7 Using language trees
gives a historical dimension to our analysis. Coarse linguistic divisions,
such as that between Indo European and non Indo European
languages, describe cleavages that originate several thousand years
ago. In contrast, finer divisions, such as that between Dutch and
German, tend to be the result of more recent splits. For instance, Gray
and Atkinson (2003) estimate separation times between language
groups within the Indo European family. While the separation
between Indo European languages and all others is estimated to
have occurred prior to 8700 years ago, the separation time between
different dialects of Modern Greek is estimated to have occurred only
800 years ago. There are differences of opinion between linguists on
the precise dates, but the general point of an association between tree
structure and separation times remains. We do not require that there
be a strict association between the coarseness of the linguistic
classification and the time since the linguistic split between groups
occurred we only point out that coarse classifications capture
cleavages that tend to go back deeper in the past.
6 The difference in the experience of Chad and Zambia (or Afghanistan and Sri
Lanka) is not related to the use of measures of linguistic fractionalization rather than
Linguistic differentiation occurs because specific human populations
become relatively isolated from each other and, as a result, develop
deeper population cleavages. Consistent with this view, Cavalli Sforza
et al. (1988) suggest that there is a link between the major language
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Fig. 1. Phylogenetic tree of major languages in Pakistan.specific languages over time. In general threemajor factors can affect the
degree to which languages differ. The first factor is the time since the
populations speaking these languages have split from each other. As
noted, populations speaking French and Spanish have split from each
other much more recently than populations speaking, say, Swahili and
Tibetan. The second factor, known by linguists as Sprachbund (or
language union), results from interactions between populations that are
already linguistically distinct (EmeneauandAnwar, 1980). For example,
historically the spread of Latin words likely had a homogenizing
influence on European languages, keeping Romance and Germanic
languages more similar than would have been the case without
commercial and political interactions. The third factor is the size of the
population. Linguistic drift tends to be faster in smaller populations. For
instance, Lithgow (1973) studies the Muyuw language, spoken on
Woodlark Island (New Guinea): 13% of the Muyuw vocabulary was
replaced in a period of 50 years during the middle of the 20th Century
(see also Dixon, 1997, for a discussion). This language is spoken by only
6000 individuals, according to Ethnologue. Empirically, this determinant
of linguistic differentiation does not greatly affect our measures of
diversity, as it only affects very small linguistic groups. Linguistic trees
such as the one from Ethnologue, whichwe use in our empirical analysis,
are constructed by linguists to mainly capture the first factor. 8
Given that linguistic divisions arise because of splits between
populations, one would expect coarser linguistic divisions to reflect
8 There are controversies among linguists on the right classification of languages.
For example, Greenberg (1987) considers that all Native American languages can be or
di
m
classified into three groups (Eskimo-Aleut, Na-Dene and Amerindian) whereas the
Ethnologue contemplates dozens of unrelated families. However, the classification
provided in the Ethnologue is the most widely used and, to the best of our knowledge,
the only one available in electronic format covering all of the languages of the world.milies and the main human genetic clusters. Although there are some
table exceptions, subsequent studies have tended to confirm this
ding. For example, Belle and Barbujani (2007), usingmore recent data
genetic polymorphism and languages fromEthnologue, conclude that
lobally speaking, the genetic differences between the main language
yla probably reflect relatively ancient demographic subdivisions”.
We emphasize that the issue of aggregation is separate from
lthough related to) the issue of how to capture the distance
parating languages when computing measures of diversity (for a
per that accomplishes the latter goal, see Desmet et al., 2009; for
dices of fractionalization that take into account distances, see
reenberg, 1956 and Bossert et al., in press). We are after identifying
e level of aggregation that corresponds to the most relevant
eavages for the various dependent variables we examine. A focus
the level of aggregation that captures the relevant cleavages retains
strong focus on ethnolinguistic groups as the basis for individuals'
entification with, or alienation from, a given ethnolinguistic identity
group (we borrow the identification/alienation terminology from
teban and Ray, 1994). In contrast, distance weighted measures of
versity (such as themeasure proposed by Greenberg, 1956), capture
e expected distance between individuals, and relegates the group
ructure to the background. Our approach is therefore distinct from
proaches that make use of distances between groups: we are
terested in identifying the group structures (or classifications) that
atter most for political economy outcomes. At the same time, by
nstruction, more aggregated classifications retain groups that tend
be more distant from each other (in terms, say, of separation times,
in terms of how different the languages are), compared to more
saggregated classifications.
To illustrate the discussion above, Fig. 1 displays the tree for the
ajor languages in Pakistan. On the left side of the figure, we list the
4
level of aggregation. At level 7, the most disaggregated level, there are
seven main languages: Panjabi, Pashto, Sindhi, Seraiki, Urdu, Balochi,
hypothetical common ancestor language of all families, referred to by
linguists as Proto Human. The number below each living language at
Fig. 2. Hypothetical language tree.and Brahui. Going up the tree, the number of groups declines, as the
level of aggregation rises. For instance, at level 4, there are only five
linguistic groups at that level, Panjabi, Seraiki and Sindhi are
classified as one and the same. At level 3, only three linguistic groups
are left (Iranian, Indo Aryan and Northern Dravidian). Finally, at
aggregation level one, there are two groups: Dravidian (Brahui) and
Indo European (all others). These classifications allow us to compute
measures of diversity at each level of aggregation.
2.2.2. Measuring diversity at different levels of aggregation
How precisely are the measures of diversity computed? An
example of how a language tree looks like is shown in Fig. 2. The
root of the tree is represented by the upper case letter O, whereas the
leafs of the tree are represented by lower case letters a through c. In
Fig. 2, all leafs have a common root, so that the tree is rooted (this
terminology is borrowed from the field of linguistics). As can be seen,
the tree has three different levels. Each of the seven leafs at level 2
represents a living language. The three nodes at level 1 represent the
(extinguished) mother languages of the existing languages. These
correspond to the proto languages of the different families, such as
Indo European or Sino Tibetan. The node at level 0 represents theFig. 3. Typical language tlevel 2 indicates the assumed shares of the population speaking the
corresponding language. The numbers below the (extinguished)
mother languages at level 1 are the aggregated population shares of
their corresponding daughter languages.
To compute diversity at different levels, we require that the tree be
rooted, and that thenumber of branches (or edges) between any leaf and
the root be identical. In this subsection, we focus on the widely used
index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization (or ELF), the probability that
two randomly picked individuals belong to different groups (in our
empirical work we also consider measures of polarization). The
diversity measure at a given level of aggregation is the ELF index for
the linguistic groups as they appear at that level. For example, diversity
at level 2 is given by the ELF index, taking the seven living languages as
the relevant groups. Thus, ELF 2ð Þ = 1−3 × 0:22
 
−4 × 0:12
 
=
0:84. To calculate diversity at level 1, the seven living languages are
aggregated into 3 distinct groups A, B and C, resulting in an ELF index
ELF 1ð Þ = 1−0:42−2 × 0:12
 
= 0:66.
One difficulty remains. The linguistic tree from Ethnologue is a
rooted tree, but the number of branches varies among linguistic
families and subfamilies. Fig. 3 depicts a generic language tree such as
the one from Ethnologue. If we look at the proto languages of theree from Ethnologue.
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different families (Level 1), we can see that A has more descendent 3, but assume that its mother and grandmother have all remained the
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isgenerations than B or C. As before, the leafs of the tree represent the
existing languages. They are denoted by the letters a11, a12, a21, a22,
a31, a32, b11, b12, b2, c1 and c2. It is clear that for this type of tree we
cannot use the method applied in Fig. 2, because at level 3 we would
be ignoring 3 of the 11 languages. The branches in the tree need to be
extended, and there are two main ways to do this, as displayed in the
two panels of Fig. 4. This ensures that all the existing languages are
represented as leafs at the lowest level of aggregation.
The first approach, displayed in Panel I of Fig. 4, assumes that all
living languages are equally distant from the proto languages of their
respective families, where the distance between languages is defined
by the number of branches or nodes separating them (in technical
terms, this assumes that the tree is ultrametric). Take, for example,
language c1. We insert a fictitious language, c1*, at level 2, so that the
total number of branches between c1 and the origin language of the
family, C, is the same as for all other leafs. The second approach,
displayed in Panel II of Fig. 4, assumes that c1 is only one branch
removed from its origin language C. In this case, Fig. 4 shows that to
have all living languages at the same level, we move c1 down to levelFig. 4. Two differentme as the origin language C.
In our empirical work, we favor measures based on the first
proach, because it is reasonable to assume that languages went
rough intermediate states between the proto languages of their
spective families and their current form. The second approach, in
ntrast, assumes that some origin languages remained unchanged
ntil recently. A further advantage of the first approach is that it does
ot change the “family relations” of the original Ethnologue trees.
r example, in Fig. 3 language b1 has a sister b2 and a mother B; this
still so under the first approach, but not under the second
proach, where the mother and the sister of b1 are now the same
nguage.
Although there are good reasons to prefer the first approach, for the
ke of robustness we also computed and used measures based on the
cond approach. Using either approach did not make much difference
r our empirical results. Based on either approach, our empirical results
ow that diversity measures based on either the highest level of
gregationor the lowest level of aggregationmattermost. FromFig. 4 it
easy to see that, at the two extremes, both approaches are identical, soapproaches.
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that using one or the other should make no difference (we report on
these empirical results in greater details in Section 5).
Interesting information can also be gleaned from Panel B of
Table 2, displaying correlations. First, changing the level of aggrega
Table 2
Summary statistics for ethnolinguistic diversity measures.
Panel A. Means and standard deviations
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ELF(1) 0.156 0.180 0.000 0.647
ELF(3) 0.241 0.221 0.000 0.818
ELF(6) 0.328 0.272 0.000 0.941
ELF(10) 0.394 0.301 0.000 0.989
ELF(15) 0.412 0.308 0.000 0.990
POL(1) 0.283 0.314 0.000 0.999
POL(3) 0.384 0.316 0.000 0.998
POL(6) 0.423 0.297 0.000 0.996
POL(10) 0.435 0.279 0.000 0.996
POL(15) 0.432 0.278 0.000 0.996
Panel B. Correlations
ELF(1) ELF(3) ELF(6) ELF(10) ELF(15) POL(1) POL(3) POL(6) POL(10)
ELF(3) 0.770 1
ELF(6) 0.579 0.826 1
ELF(10) 0.544 0.708 0.848 1
ELF(15) 0.526 0.672 0.798 0.977 1
POL(1) 0.988 0.754 0.565 0.530 0.514 1
POL(3) 0.720 0.939 0.788 0.683 0.651 0.737 1
POL(6) 0.545 0.691 0.821 0.697 0.654 0.563 0.763 1
POL(10) 0.444 0.568 0.643 0.664 0.638 0.466 0.637 0.838 1
POL(15) 0.391 0.513 0.595 0.542 0.555 0.408 0.572 0.777 0.925
226 observations.
true. The intuition for why this result does not always hold is related to the fact that
fractionalization decreases with aggregation, whereas polarization could increase or
decrease with aggregation. Of course, at the highest level of aggregation, most
countries have only one or two groups left, in which case the two indices coincide (up
to a constant). This explains the correlation of 0.988 between ELF(1) and POL(1).
10 For instance, if we consider countries with more than half a million inhabitants, 23
of the 30 most diverse countries in the world are located in Sub-Saharan Africa at the
most disaggregated level (ELF(15)). At the least diaggregated level (ELF(1)), only 10 of
the 30 most diverse countries are in this region.
72.3. Measurement, summary statistics and specification
We consider two sets of commonly used measures of diversity:
fractionalization and polarization. For i(j)=1,…,N(j) groups of size si(j),
where j=1,…, J denotes the level of disaggregation at which the group
shares are considered, fractionalization is just the probability that two
individuals chosen at random, will belong to different groups:
ELF jð Þ = 1 ∑
N jð Þ
i jð Þ=1
si jð Þ
h i2 ð1Þ
This measure is maximized when each individual belongs to a
different group. Polarization, in contrast, is maximizedwhen there are
two groups of equal size. We use the polarization measure from
Montalvo and Reynal Querol (2005). This index satisfies the condi
tions for a desirable index of polarization in the axiomatic approach of
Esteban and Ray (1994):
POL jð Þ = 4 ∑
N jð Þ
i jð Þ=1
si jð Þ
h i2
1 si jð Þ
h i
ð2Þ
We compute these measures at each of the 15 levels of aggregation
available in the linguistic classification in the 15th edition of Ethnologue,
the source for our linguistic data (Ethnologue, 2005). The sample
contains 226 observations which include countries and their depen
dencies (due to data availability, our regression results are based on a
smaller set of countries). Table 2 presents summary statistics for the
diversity measures at 5 levels of aggregation (an online Appendix
contains the corresponding data series by country). To facilitate the
quantitative assessment of the regression results, Panel A displays
means and standard deviations. When measured using the ELF index,
the average degree of diversity rises as the level of aggregation falls, as
expected. When measured using a polarization index, diversity falls at
high levels of aggregation, and plateaus as aggregation falls further. To
simplify the presentation of our results, in the empirical sections we
focus on only 3 levels of aggregation (levels 1, 6 and 15, with higher
numbers denoting a lower degree of aggregation). All our empirical
results are also available at the other levels.tion greatly affects the measures of diversity: the correlation between
ELF(1) and ELF(15) is only 0.526. Second, the correlation between
polarization and fractionalization, at the same levels of aggregation,
rises as the level of aggregation increases (the correlation between
POL(15) and ELF(15) is only 0.555, while the correlation between ELF
(1) and POL(1) is 0.988). This is intuitive as, when aggregating, fewer
groups remain, and the distinction between polarization and
fractionalization fades.9 Third, aggregating up is not the same as
switching from a measure of fractionalization to a measure of
polarization: the correlation between ELF(1) and POL(15) is only
0.391. This last observation indicates that the issue of aggregation is
very different from the choice of functional form to compute diversity
measures. In our empirical work, we show that switching from
fractionalization to polarizationmeasures has relatively benign effects
on the substantive results, while changing the level of aggregation to
compute either measure delivers vastly different estimates of the
effect of diversity on political economy outcome.
Finally, Figs. 5 and 6 display the full distributions of ELF(1), ELF(15),
POL(1) and POL(15). As can be seen, at high levels of aggregation the
distributions of both fractionalization (ELF(1)) and polarization (POL(1))
have a strongpositive skew. Thismakes sense:whenclassifying languages
to be different only when they pertain to entirely different families, most
countries display low levels of diversity, and only a few exhibit high
diversity. In contrast, at low levels of aggregation the distributions of
fractionalization (ELF(15)) and polarization (POL(15)) are much more
uniform. That is, many of the countries that were not diverse when only
looking at language families are now much more diverse.10 This is the
9 Although we find that the correlation between fractionalization and polarization
increases with aggregation, it is easy to find counterexamples for which this is not
example of Zambiamentioned above: it is highly diverse if each of the 46 (never surpassing 0.20). Taken together, the evidence suggests that
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Fig. 5. Distributions of ELF-1 and ELF-15.
10
0languages are taken to be different, and it is not very diverse when one
considers that only 2 out of the 46 languages do not belong to the Niger
Congo family.
Another relevant question is whether linguistic diversity mea
sured at different levels of aggregation proxies for different types of
diversity. In particular, we can ask how linguistic diversity measured
at varying levels of aggregation relates to religious diversity or ethnic
diversity. The data show that the correlation of ELF(15) with ethnic
fractionalization from the Atlas Narodov Mira is 0.82 and with the
Alesina et al. (2003) measure of ethnic fractionalization it is 0.67.
These correlations drop to the 0.35−0.40 range when using ELF(1). It
therefore does not seem the case that aggregating is equivalent to
proxying for ethnic diversity. The same conclusion emerges when
analyzing religious diversity. The correlation between ELF(15) and
religious fractionalization from the Alesina et al. (2003) dataset is
0.195, and at the level of ELF(1) this correlation drops to 0.098.
Obviously it is possible that if one were to aggregate religions or
ethnicities, using a procedure similar to the one used here for
languages, the correlation with ELF(1) would increase. If so, this
would simply reinforce our point: what matters is aggregation and
not whether one measures diversity using languages, ethnicities or
religions. In the case of religion there is some evidence in favor of this
view. Gomes (2010), for example, finds that the correlation between
religious diversity and our measure of ELF(1) increases when
aggregating religions, although the correlation continues to be low
10
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Fig. 6. Distributions of POhen going from ELF(15) to ELF(1) we are indeed measuring
versity at higher levels of aggregation, rather than proxying for
her types of diversity. Our claim that we are capturing deeper
eavages when aggregating is consistent with the fact that the main
nguage families reflect the main demographic divisions in the world
elle and Barbujani, 2007).
We use these measures to investigate the effects of linguistic
versity at various levels of aggregation on various political and
onomic outcomes. Our econometric specification builds on the
isting literature on the determinants of public goods, civil conflict,
distribution and economic growth, but uses a common set of
ntrols to ensure some consistency across the different dependent
riables:
t = βXit + γZit + δDi jð Þ + εit ð3Þ
here yit is the dependent variable of interest, Xit is a vector of controls
ecific to outcome y, Zit is a vector of controls common to all outcomes
and Di(j) is either a measure of polarization (POL) or fractionalization
LF) at aggregation level j. The common set of controls Zit includes 1)
ntinent dummy variables for Sub Saharan Africa, East and Southeast
ia, Latin America and the Caribbean and 2) legal origin dummies from
Porta et al. (1999). The Xit controls that are specific to each set of
pendent variables are taken from the main contributions from the
spective literatures on the determinants of the various outcome0 2 4 6 8 1
POL-15
L-1 and POL-15.
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variables under consideration (these are detailed in the following
section for instance, the civil conflict specification includes variables
11
3. Linguistic diversity, civil conflict and redistribution
Table 3
Civil conflict and linguistic diversity (1945–1999). Dependent variable: onset of civil war, logit estimator.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ELF(1) ELF(6) ELF(15) POL(1) POL(6) POL(15)
ELF (at different levels of aggregation) 1.157 0.040 0.165
[0.545]⁎⁎ [0.417] [0.466]
POL (at different levels of aggregation) 0.720 0.324 0.669
[0.318]⁎⁎ [0.427] [0.483]
Lagged civil war 0.901 0.852 0.845 0.913 0.870 0.874
[0.255]⁎⁎⁎ [0.257]⁎⁎⁎ [0.259]⁎⁎⁎ [0.257]⁎⁎⁎ [0.265]⁎⁎⁎ [0.259]⁎⁎⁎
Log lagged GDP/cap 0.616 0.613 0.627 0.615 0.619 0.610
[0.140]⁎⁎⁎ [0.152]⁎⁎⁎ [0.153]⁎⁎⁎ [0.140]⁎⁎⁎ [0.146]⁎⁎⁎ [0.143]⁎⁎⁎
Log lagged population 0.311 0.293 0.300 0.310 0.300 0.298
[0.068]⁎⁎⁎ [0.071]⁎⁎⁎ [0.071]⁎⁎⁎ [0.067]⁎⁎⁎ [0.071]⁎⁎⁎ [0.069]⁎⁎⁎
% mountainous 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.009
[0.005]⁎ [0.005]⁎ [0.005]⁎ [0.005]⁎ [0.005]⁎ [0.004]⁎⁎
Noncontiguous state dummy 0.616 0.518 0.511 0.639 0.445 0.432
[0.357]⁎ [0.355] [0.349] [0.360]⁎ [0.365] [0.361]
Oil exporter dummy 0.621 0.724 0.746 0.601 0.742 0.783
[0.246]⁎⁎ [0.243]⁎⁎⁎ [0.245]⁎⁎⁎ [0.248]⁎⁎ [0.241]⁎⁎⁎ [0.244]⁎⁎⁎
New state dummy (1st or 2nd year from independence) 1.766 1.775 1.780 1.763 1.783 1.793
[0.367]⁎⁎⁎ [0.369]⁎⁎⁎ [0.368]⁎⁎⁎ [0.367]⁎⁎⁎ [0.370]⁎⁎⁎ [0.373]⁎⁎⁎
Instability dummy (3 years prior) 0.643 0.646 0.645 0.645 0.649 0.661
[0.214]⁎⁎⁎ [0.218]⁎⁎⁎ [0.217]⁎⁎⁎ [0.213]⁎⁎⁎ [0.217]⁎⁎⁎ [0.217]⁎⁎⁎
Democracy lagged (Polity 2) 0.016 0.019 0.020 0.016 0.020 0.020
[0.020] [0.021] [0.021] [0.020] [0.021] [0.021]
French legal origin dummy 1.383 1.453 1.553 1.396 1.571 1.686
[0.648]⁎⁎ [0.673]⁎⁎ [0.665]⁎⁎ [0.646]⁎⁎ [0.651]⁎⁎ [0.640]⁎⁎⁎
UK legal origin dummy 0.947 1.152 1.267 0.938 1.252 1.399
[0.672] [0.705] [0.725]⁎ [0.670] [0.668]⁎ [0.648]⁎⁎
Socialist legal origin dummy 1.126 1.237 1.282 1.133 1.299 1.408
[0.694] [0.707]⁎ [0.697]⁎ [0.693] [0.701]⁎ [0.692]⁎⁎
Latin America and Caribbean dummy 0.094 0.112 0.054 0.113 0.015 0.107
[0.385] [0.404] [0.407] [0.383] [0.412] [0.411]
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy 0.165 0.156 0.176 0.182 0.101 0.041
[0.342] [0.330] [0.320] [0.344] [0.329] [0.335]
East and Southeast Asia dummy 0.246 0.266 0.294 0.275 0.263 0.270
[0.298] [0.316] [0.324] [0.298] [0.309] [0.298]
Constant 4.425 4.205 4.160 4.459 4.108 4.125
[1.604]⁎⁎⁎ [1.627]⁎⁎⁎ [1.623]⁎⁎ [1.599]⁎⁎⁎ [1.611]⁎⁎ [1.604]⁎⁎
Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of countries, in parentheses.
All columns involve 5733 observations from 142 countries from 1945 to 1999.
The table reports logit coefficients, not marginal effects.
Results are robust to controlling for the growth of GDP per capita, the growth of GDP per capita lagged, a lagged dichotomous indicator of democracy (instead of the Polity2 index), a
squared term for ELF (or POL), a dummy for the new world (and interaction between the new world dummy and diversity), and an anocracy dummy. Results are also robust to
introducing ELF(1), ELF(6) and ELF(15) simultaneously (or, similarly, POL(1), POL(6) and POL(15)).
The data is from Fearon and Laitin (2003), except for ELF (authors' calculations from Ethnologue database) and legal origin (from LLSV, 1999).
⁎ Significant at 10%.
⁎⁎ Significant at 5%.
⁎⁎⁎ Significant at 1%.from Fearon and Laitin, 2003). The estimation method also follows
these major contributions, though we strive to use cross sectional
approacheswhenever possible since ourmeasures of linguistic diversity
do not vary through time (only in the case of civil conflict onset do we
use a pooled panel probit approach as this is the only way to study the
determinants of conflict onset).
The main coefficient of interest in our study is δ, the partial
correlation of linguistic diversity and each relevant political or
economic outcome. Caution should be exercised when interpreting
δ causally. We follow the literature in considering that linguistic
diversity is a highly time persistent variable that is likely to be largely
historically determined well before our dependent variables are
observed. On the other hand, the possibility of reverse causality
cannot be entirely ruled out, as discussed in Alesina et al. (2003) and
Caselli and Coleman (2010). Thus, we refrain from causal statements,
as causality is not the main focus of this paper.
11 Further, we use the broadest set of controls from these existing studies. Together
with the consistent addition of the Z variables in all specifications, this should limit the
incidence of omitted variables bias.3.1. Civil conflict
There is an ongoing academic debate on the relationship between
ethnolinguistic diversity and the onset of civil conflict. In a seminal
paper, Fearon and Laitin (2003) argued that once measures of income
per capita are controlled for, measures of ethnic and religious
fractionalization areunrelated to theonsetof civil conflict.We reexamine
this issue using the baseline specification in Fearon and Laitin's study
(column 1 of their Table 1, page 84), augmented with our Z controls.
Using their data, their estimation method and their dependent variable
(the onset of civil conflict), we simply substitute our measures of
linguistic heterogeneity for their measure of ethnic fractionalization.
Results are presented in Table 3 for selected representative levels of
aggregation (1, 6 and 15). The standardized magnitude of the effects of
linguistic fractionalization on the probability of conflict onset is
displayed graphically at all levels of aggregation in Fig. 7.12
12 The standardized magnitude is computed as the effect of a one standard deviation
change in linguistic diversity at each level of aggregation as a percentage of the mean
probability of conflict.
9
The first and most important observation is that the effect of superficial divisions do not. Since there are few countries that feature
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Fig. 7. Marginal effect of a one standard deviation increase in ELF (as % of the mean probability of civil conflict onset).
10fractionalization and the corresponding level of statistical significance
both fall dramatically and monotonically when the level of aggregation
falls. At level j=1 (the most aggregated level), linguistic fractionaliza
tionhas a coefficient of 1.157with a t statistic of 2.12, and the coefficient
falls to −0.165 with a t statistic of 0.35 at level j=15. This pattern is
robust to using polarization instead of fractionalization. The second
observation is that the coefficient on linguistic diversity is only positive
and significant when considering the most aggregated classification of
languages whether for polarization or for fractionalization. The
coefficient remains significant at least at the 10% level for most of the
robustness tests we conducted but since the level of significance
sometimes falls below 5%wewant to be cautious in claiming that there
exists a robust relationship even at this level of aggregation. A
conservative reading of our results suggests that, to the extent there is
a statistically significant link between diversity and civil conflict, it only
appears when the relevant cleavages are the deepest (aggregation level
1). In terms of economic magnitude, the estimated effects are far from
trivial at aggregation level 1. When evaluating marginal effects at the
mean of all the independent variables, a one standard deviation change
in linguistic fractionalization (0.173) is associated with an increase in
the probability of conflict equal to roughly 13% of this variable's mean
(the mean probability of civil war onset is 1.666% in the sample). This
effect quickly fades to zero as the level of aggregation falls, as displayed
graphically in Fig. 7. The standardized magnitude is similar for
polarization at aggregation level 1, and fades to zero also.
The pattern of coefficients across levels of aggregation is robust to a
wide range of modifications of the baseline specification for fraction
alization: 1) substituting a dichotomous measure of democracy for the
continuous one, 2) controlling for intermediate levels of democracy
(anocracy), 3) redefining civil wars to only include “ethnic” civil wars
(as defined in Fearon and Laitin, 2003), 4) using the Correlates of War
definition of civil wars instead of Fearon and Laitin's, 5) controlling for
GDP growth and lagged growth and 6) using the incidence of conflict
rather than the onset, as Montalvo and Reynal Querol (2005) did in
their study. These results are available upon request. In addition to these
checks, which are specific to civil conflict, we also run a number of
further robustness tests that are common across the different
dependent variables. We discuss those in Section 5.
As shown in Figs. 5 and 6, most countries in the world appear very
homogeneous at level 1. Countries that do feature such cleavages tend
to coincide with the geographic breakpoints of major linguistic
groups, such as in Chad. Our results indicate that ethnolinguistic
divisions of this nature may matter for civil conflict, but that moregh levels of diversity at the very aggregated level of linguistic
milies, civil conflict related to this type of cleavage must be
latively rare.
Where does this leave us in the debate about the role of
hnolinguistic diversity as a determinant of civil wars? On the one
nd, for all but one level of aggregation, ethnic diversity does not
atter. Aswas recognized in the past literature, this does not imply that
vil conflicts do not often have an ethnic dimension conditional on
ving a civil conflict, it may very well be waged along ethnic or
guistic lines (for instance ethnolinguistic differences may help
entify combatants, as in the famous Biblical example of the
ibboleth). This is compatible with a finding that linguistic diversity
unrelated to the probability of conflict onset. On the other hand, we
dfind that the significance andmagnitudeof diversity rises as the level
aggregation increases. To the extent that civil conflict is associated
ith the “us” versus “them” divide, this result helps clarify that “us” and
hem” need to be separated by deep historical and cultural cleavages
r these divides to have any claim of affecting the onset of civil conflict.
selli and Coleman (2010) provide a possible explanation for this
ding. They argue that large differences make groups less porous.
anging sides is difficult and costly, thus giving the winning group
clusive access to the gains from the conflict.
2. Redistribution
Avast literatureexamines the roleof ethnic and linguistic differences
a determinant of the extent of income redistribution. At the
icroeconomic level, several authors have examined the propensity
redistribute. For instance, Luttmer and Fong (2009) find in an
perimental setting that people donate more money to Hurricane
trina victims when the victims are perceived to be of the same
hnicity as the donor. In another study, Luttmer (2001) reports that
ndividuals increase their support for welfare spending as the share of
cal recipients from their own racial group rises”, using data from the
nited States, also suggesting a preference channel. These results are in
e with those of Alesina et al. (2001), as well as Alesina and Glaeser
004), arguing that the U.S. redistributes less than Europe in part
cause of its greater degree of ethnic heterogeneity.13
3 Our paper uses linguistic heterogeneity rather than ethnic differences, so by our
easures the US would look quite more homogeneous than if we focused on ethnicity.
is would affect our results in the direction of making it less likely to find any effect of
At the cross country level, results are more mixed. While the striking pattern: linguistic diversity negatively affects redistribution at
preponderance of evidence points to a negative association between
ethnolinguistic fractionalization and redistribution, this finding is not
always robust to the use of alternative measures of diversity and to
the inclusion of controls. For instance, in Alesina et al. (2003), the
effect of ethnolinguistic fractionalization on the share of transfers and
subsidies to GDP appears sensitive, in terms of statistical significance,
to the inclusion of several control variables. This study measures
fractionalization using a rather disaggregated classification of ethnic
and linguistic groups. In a broad cross country sample, Desmet et al.
(2009) find that linguistic diversity, measured to account for the
distance between groups, is negatively associated with redistribution,
measured by the share of transfers and subsidies in GDP. However,
this result does not hold when measures of diversity do not account
for the degree of linguistic distance between groups, suggesting that
the depth of linguistic cleavages matters. In a wide variety of settings,
ethnolinguistic diversity seems associated with lower redistribution,
but what cleavages are more or less relevant to account for these
findings has not been determined.
We start from the specification and data in Desmet et al. (2009) to
examine what level of linguistic aggregation matters for redistribution,
i.e.what are the relevant cleavages. Thedependent variable is the average
share of transfers and subsidies in GDP between 1985 and 1995. The
specification is the one that involves the broadest set of control variables
including GDP per capita, country size and the percentage of the
population over 65 (Table 2, column8 inDesmet et al., 2009), augmented
by our Z controls. Table 4 present the results for fractionalization and
polarization. The results for both measures are similar, and reveal a
Table 4
Redistribution and linguistic diversity (1985–1995). Dependent variable: transfers and sub
(1) (2)
ELF(1) ELF(6)
ELF (at different levels of aggregation) 4.472 1.812
[2.036]⁎⁎ [1.364]
POL (at different levels of aggregation)
Log GDP per capita 1985–95 1.274 1.173
[0.557]⁎⁎ [0.558]⁎⁎
Log population 1985–95 0.265 0.335
[0.300] [0.302]
Population above 65 0.877 0.893
[0.137]⁎⁎⁎ [0.147]⁎⁎⁎
Small island dummy 6.237 5.766
[2.336]⁎⁎⁎ [2.123]⁎⁎⁎
Latitude 4.137 5.080
[4.735] [4.668]
UK legal origin dummy 3.879 3.297
[2.633] [2.775]
French legal origin dummy 4.526 4.472
[2.692]⁎ [2.857]
Socialist legal origin dummy 8.894 8.275
[3.557]⁎⁎ [3.617]⁎⁎
Scandinavian legal origin dummy 5.548 4.751
[2.915]⁎ [2.990]
Latin America & Caribbean dummy 1.845 2.309
[1.102]⁎ [1.168]⁎
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy 0.289 0.343
[1.132] [1.156]
East and Southeast Asia dummy 4.193 4.193
[1.834]⁎⁎ [1.845]⁎⁎
Constant 15.691 16.099
[7.933]⁎ [7.813]⁎⁎
Robust standard errors, in parentheses.
All columns involve 103 country observations.
Results are robust to controlling for religious affiliation (as in Desmet et al., 2009), a square
world dummy and diversity). Results are also robust to introducing ELF(1), ELF(6) and ELF
The data is from Desmet et al. (2009), except for diversity measures (authors' calculations
⁎ Significant at 10%.
⁎⁎ Significant at 5%.
⁎⁎⁎ Significant at 1%.high levels of aggregation, but the effect declines in magnitude as the
level of aggregation falls, and ceases to be statistically significant at the5%
level after aggregation level 5: Fig. 8 displays this pattern, plotting the
standardized beta on fractionalization (i.e. the effect of a one standard
deviation increase in fractionalization as a fraction of a one standard
deviation change in the dependent variable) against the level of
aggregation. The effect of ELF(1) is substantial in magnitude, as it equals
−9.6% and is significant at the 5% level. It falls to a statistically significant
−7.5% for ELF(5) and ceases to be statistically significant thereafter.
These results are robust to considering alternative sets of controls, as in
Desmet et al. (2009),with the caveat thatwith a sufficiently restricted set
of control variables, the effect of linguistic diversity remains statistically
significant even at low levels of aggregation, although significance is
greater for high levels of aggregation.
To summarize, we find that for redistribution, as for conflict, the
relevant cleavages are those that capture deep ethnolinguistic splits,
rather thandivisions that aremore recentandsuperficial. Commentators
often point out that solidarity does not travelwell across groups.Wefind
that solidarity travels without trouble across groups that are separated
by shallow gullies, but not across those separated by deep canyons.
4. Linguistic diversity, public goods and growth
4.1. Public goods
The effect of ethnolinguistic diversity on the provision of public
goods raises interesting conceptual issues. On the one hand, publicsidies as share of GDP, least squares estimator.
(3) (4) (5) (6)
ELF(15) POL(1) POL(6) POL(15)
1.547
[1.493]
2.749 2.134 2.056
[1.211]⁎⁎ [1.561] [1.828]
1.198 1.270 1.256 1.232
[0.562]⁎⁎ [0.558]⁎⁎ [0.575]⁎⁎ [0.576]⁎⁎
0.352 0.288 0.284 0.284
[0.306] [0.296] [0.296] [0.300]
0.902 0.879 0.884 0.892
[0.149]⁎⁎⁎ [0.138]⁎⁎⁎ [0.156]⁎⁎⁎ [0.154]⁎⁎⁎
5.749 6.125 6.038 6.075
[2.148]⁎⁎⁎ [2.319]⁎⁎⁎ [2.130]⁎⁎⁎ [2.169]⁎⁎⁎
4.899 3.997 5.344 5.809
[4.618] [4.735] [4.607] [4.616]
3.417 3.864 2.938 3.186
[2.821] [2.616] [2.795] [2.851]
4.480 4.494 4.106 4.234
[2.857] [2.677]⁎ [2.887] [2.895]
8.359 8.905 8.000 8.053
[3.628]⁎⁎ [3.539]⁎⁎ [3.595]⁎⁎ [3.609]⁎⁎
4.838 5.570 4.102 4.166
[2.983] [2.897]⁎ [2.991] [2.980]
2.242 1.866 2.347 2.206
[1.136]⁎ [1.102]⁎ [1.205]⁎ [1.176]⁎
0.178 0.305 0.379 0.328
[1.223] [1.131] [1.171] [1.241]
4.182 4.383 4.788 4.628
[1.839]⁎⁎ [1.823]⁎⁎ [1.799]⁎⁎⁎ [1.742]⁎⁎⁎
16.730 15.910 15.263 15.518
[7.876]⁎⁎ [7.867]⁎⁎ [7.667]⁎⁎ [7.816]⁎
d term for ELF (or POL), a dummy for the new world (and interaction between the new
(15) simultaneously (or, similarly, POL(1), POL(6) and POL(15)).
from Ethnologue database).
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goods entail a dimension of redistribution, and differences in
preferences may hinder their provision. In this sense, there is an
Instead of focusing on a broad set of measures of the quality of
government as they did, we focus on the category of dependent
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are unchanged when using kilometers per square kilometer of land area instead.
Results are available upon request.
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Fig. 8. Effect of a one standard deviation increase in ELF on redistribution (as % of standard deviation of redistribution).
12element of conflict of interest when it comes to public goods. On
the other hand, free rider problems and coordination failures need
to be overcome for the effective provision of public goods.
Linguistic diversity may work to affect public goods through both
channels.
Several studies have explored the relationship between public
goods provision and ethnolinguistic diversity, both across and within
countries. In their important study of the cross national determinants
of the quality of government, La Porta et al. (1999, henceforth LLSV)
showed that ethnolinguistic fractionalization, measured by an
average of five existing indices of fractionalization, generally had a
negative impact on several measures of public goods, such as literacy
rates, infant mortality, school attainment and infrastructure. Alesina
et al. (2003) broadly confirmed these results using new data on
ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalization and polarization,
although the results were somewhat sensitive to the chosen measure
of diversity and specification. In a within country context, Alesina et
al. (1999) showed that across cities, metropolitan areas and urban
counties of the United States, greater ethnic diversity was associated
with lower provision of education, roads and sewers.
In a more microeconomic context, Habyarimana et al. (2007)
report that in a variety of games, co ethnic participants from a sample
of slum dwellers in Kampala, Uganda, play cooperative strategies
more so than players from different ethnic groups. This is consistent
with findings in Miguel and Gugerty (2005), suggesting that public
goods provision is lower inmore ethnically diverse locations in Kenya.
Other studies include Vigdor (2004) who shows that higher racial,
generational and socioeconomic heterogeneity across US counties is
associated with lower response rates to the 2000 Census question
naire, and Banerjee et al. (2005)who, in the context of rural India, find
that higher caste and religious fragmentation is associated with lower
provision of a wide range of public goods. Although these results are
compelling, it is not clear what ethnolinguistic cleavages are most
relevant as determinants of public goods provision.
To analyze empirically the relationship between diversity com
puted at different levels of aggregation and the provision of public
goods, we start with the econometric specification and data in LLSV
(1999). To minimize the potential for omitted variables bias, we focus
on a specification that include a large set of control variables
including legal origins, GNP per capita, latitude and regional dummies.riables they label “output of public goods”. This includes log infant
ortality, log of school attainment, the illiteracy rate, and an index of
frastructure quality.
The results are presented in the top panel of Table 5. For three of
e four dependent variables, the statistical significance of the
efficient on ELF rises as the level of aggregation goes from very
gregated (j=1) to less aggregated (j=6). For two of those the
atistical significance further rises when moving to the finest level of
gregation (j=15). For illustrative purposes, the evolution of the
andardized magnitude of the coefficient on fractionalization as the
vel of aggregation falls is displayed in Fig. 9 for the illiteracy rate. The
andardized magnitude of the coefficient on ELF rises steadily from
to 25%. The effects are of the expected signs, namely linguistic
actionalization is negatively associated with school attainment, but
sitively associated with log infant mortality and the illiteracy rate.
ere is no significant association with the index of infrastructure
ality at any level of aggregation (this was also the case in LLSV). The
SV measure of ethnolinguistic fractionalization is most highly
rrelated with ELF(15) the correlation between the two measures
0.835, and falls steadily as the level of aggregation rises.
rrespondingly, in quantitative terms the magnitude of our
timates is very close to LLSV's when ELF is measured at aggregation
vel 15. Finally, comparing results on fractionalization and polariza
on, we see that linguistic fractionalization is a slightly better
edictor of public goods than linguistic polarization, but the same
ttern emerges with respect to aggregation levels.
In order to investigate whether these results hold up to using a
oader set of indicators of public goods provision, the bottom panel
Table 5 considers 6 additional dependent variables, taken from the
orld Development Indicators (World Bank, 2008). These include
easures of health care (hospital beds per person, measles immuni
tion rates for children), measures of access to public services
vailability of sanitation services and clean water), and specific
easures of infrastructure (road and rail network density).14 The
sults show that: 1) for measures of sanitation and clean water, the
4 We measure the latter as a ratio of kilometers per 1000 inhabitants, but the results
effect of fractionalization becomes more statistically significant as the
level of aggregation falls; 2) for measures of health services, the effect
geneity. In addition, the paper found that fractionalization mea
sures were more robust predictors of growth than polarization
Alesina and La Ferrara (2005). This is related to a more microeconomic approach
highlighting the costs and benefits of cultural and linguistic diversity within teams or
organizations. See for instance Cremer et al. (2007), Lazear (1999), and Prat (2002).
While at the cross-country level the empirical results point to a negative relationship
between ethnolinguistic diversity and growth, the findings are more contrasted at the
within-firm level, with some studies pointing to positive effects of diversity. At the
cross-city level in the U.S., Ottaviano and Peri (2006) also point to a positive effect of
cultural diversity on the productivity of U.S. natives.
16 Hauk and Wacziarg (2009), using simulations based on the Solow model, show
that running growth regressions using OLS on a single cross-section of countries
provides the least biased coefficients on the determinants of growth in the presence of
a multiplicity of data problems, such as regressor endogeneity, cross-country
heterogeneity and measurement error.
Table 5
Public goods and linguistic diversity, OLS estimates (dependent variable listed in the leftmost column).
ELF(1) ELF(6) ELF(15) POL(1) POL(6) POL(15) # of
obs.
Adj-R2
min
Adj-R2
max
Output of public goods (from LLSV, 1999)
Log infant mortality 0.466 0.413 0.512 0.248 0.379 0.501 173 0.78 0.8
[0.199]⁎⁎ [0.122]⁎⁎⁎ [0.113]⁎⁎⁎ [0.107]⁎⁎ [0.113]⁎⁎⁎ [0.118]⁎⁎⁎
Log of school attainment 0.143 0.261 0.203 0.050 0.097 0.003 101 0.74 0.76
[0.215] [0.137]⁎ [0.142] [0.108] [0.109] [0.145]
Illiteracy rate 6.891 20.662 17.784 3.506 18.174 12.674 119 0.48 0.54
[8.314] [5.166]⁎⁎⁎ [5.086]⁎⁎⁎ [4.746] [5.316]⁎⁎⁎ [6.344]⁎⁎
Infrastructure quality index 0.167 0.095 0.229 0.133 0.077 0.224 59 0.77 0.78
[0.819] [0.452] [0.474] [0.496] [0.427] [0.463]
Additional measures of public goods
Hospital beds (per 1000 people) 1.061 0.595 0.058 0.452 0.227 0.759 170 0.46 0.46
[1.000] [0.608] [0.637] [0.577] [0.760] [0.924]
Measles immunization rates (% of children 12–
23 months)
23.203 17.138 13.152 12.194 12.545 7.613 169 0.5 0.56
[5.831]⁎⁎⁎ [3.805]⁎⁎⁎ [3.896]⁎⁎⁎ [3.439]⁎⁎⁎ [3.587]⁎⁎⁎ [4.172]⁎
Improved sanitation facilities (% of population
with access)
12.536 16.374 23.398 5.481 15.890 10.908 147 0.72 0.76
[8.487] [5.120]⁎⁎⁎ [5.217]⁎⁎⁎ [4.852] [5.056]⁎⁎⁎ [5.700]⁎
Improved water source (% of population with
access)
13.896 6.985 13.995 7.790 7.135 3.920 157 0.59 0.62
[7.195]⁎ [4.651] [4.074]⁎⁎⁎ [4.124]⁎ [4.162]⁎ [4.726]
Road network density (km per 1000 inhabitants) 4.426 3.159 1.870 2.842 1.505 3.386 151 0.27 0.28
[4.338] [1.812]⁎ [2.101] [2.259] [2.353] [2.509]
Rail network density (km per 1000 inhabitants) 0.299 0.055 0.151 0.140 0.085 0.107 89 0.33 0.35
[0.311] [0.140] [0.164] [0.144] [0.183] [0.161]
Robust standard errors in brackets.
For all regressions, the specification includes the following controls: Socialist legal origin dummy, French legal origin dummy, German legal origin dummy, Scandinavian legal origin
dummy, East and Southeast Asia dummy, Sub-Saharan Africa dummy, Latin America and Caribbean dummy, latitude and log GNP per capita. The table reports coefficient estimates
on diversity indices at various levels of aggregation, in regressions where the dependent variable is the one listed in the leftmost column. The data is from LLSV (1999) and theWorld
Bank (2008), except for diversity measures (authors' calculations from Ethnologue database).
⁎ Significant at 10%.
⁎⁎ Significant at 5%.
⁎⁎⁎ Significant at 1%.
13of ELF remains consistently significant for the measles immunization
rate across aggregation levels, but is insignificant for hospital beds; 3)
infrastructure measures are unaffected by fractionalization whatever
the level of aggregation; and 4) fractionalization is usually a better
predictor of public goods provision than polarization.
To summarize, across a wide range of measures of public goods, we
broadly confirm results from the literature referenced above:
ethnolinguistic diversity is negatively related to public goods
provision. Public goods share both dimensions of conflict of interest
(different tastes for public goods) and coordination (need to
overcome free rider problems). Correspondingly we find that for
several of the measures of public goods provision (infant mortality,
measles immunization rates), diversity at all levels matters statisti
cally. However, we also find that, broadly speaking, measures of
fractionalization based on finer classifications of linguistic groups tend
to matter more than those based on deep cleavages only. In contrast
with redistribution, for which only deep splits were important, even
relatively recent and shallow linguistic cleavages seem sufficient to
hinder the provision of public goods.
4.2. Growth
In recent years, scholars have focused on ethnolinguistic
diversity as a determinant of economic performance. Easterly and
Levine (1997) argue that ethnic diversity, measured by an index of
fractionalization, may account for much of Africa's growth tragedy.
These cross country results were reinforced and extended in
Alesina et al. (2003). In particular, the latter paper showed that
linguistic diversity per se, not just ethnic diversity, has a
significantly negative effect on per capita income growth in a
panel of countries, so that both ethnic and linguistic diversity are
alternative ways to capture a broader concept of cultural heteromeasures, an issue we revisit below.15
To examine the impact of linguistic cleavages at various levels of
aggregation, we start from a growth specification derived from the
augmented Solow model, which includes the investment rate, a
measure of human capital (the number of years of schooling in the
adult population aged 25 and over results do not change when
using a flow measure such as the secondary school enrollment rate),
and ameasure of population growth. In addition, we includemeasures
of market size used in Ades and Glaeser (1999) and Alesina et al.
(2000), namely the ratio of imports plus exports to GDP, the log of
population, and the interaction between these two variables. Finally,
the regression includes our full set of regional and legal origins
dummy variables. The timespan extends from 1970 to 2004, and the
regressions are run on a single cross section of 100 countries.16
Coefficient estimates are shown in Tables 6. The standardized betas on
fractionalization are displayed in Fig. 10. The effect of ELF becomes
greater in magnitude and more significant when the level of
aggregation falls, with the standardized beta equal to 2.46% for j=1,
15 For a survey of the empirical literature on ethnolinguistic diversity and economic
performance at the level of countries, cities and villages in developing countries, see
rising steadily as the level of aggregation falls, and settling around 22%
at levels j=11 and higher. The level of statistical significance also rises
deep cleavages do not contribute to negatively affecting growth, as
these deep cleavages do contribute to diversity at lower levels of
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Fig. 9. Effect of a one standard deviation increase in ELF on illiteracy rate (as % of standard deviation of illiteracy rate).with j, with ELF becoming significant at the 95% confidence level at
aggregation level j=5. Consistent with findings in Alesina et al.
(2003), polarization measures appear largely unrelated to growth.
To illustrate the quantitative importance of ethnolinguistic
diversity for economic growth, we analyze the case of the world's
two most populous countries, China and India. Both have experienced
high growth rate in recent decades, although India continues to lag
behind its East Asian neighbor. According to the Penn World Tables
(version 6.2), over the period 1970 2004 China averaged an annual
growth rate in real GDP per capita of 6.93%, compared to 2.71% in
India. China is also much less linguistically diverse than India: at
aggregation level j=15, India's ELF index is 0.93, while China's is 0.49.
Fitting the regression model in Column 3 of Table 6 to these two
datapoints, we calculate that 14.72% of the growth difference between
India and China over 1970 2004 is accounted for by differences
between these two countries in ELF(15). Thus, taken at face value
linguistic fractionalization at a high level of disaggregation can
account for a substantial portion of the growth differential between
India and China. In contrast, the share of the growth differential
accounted for by differences in ELF(1) is only 2.11%, and is not
statistically significant.
In additional empirical work available upon request, we extended
these results in various directions. First, we showed that the same
pattern of increasing growth effects of fractionalization as aggregation
falls are obtained when using exactly the specification, estimation
method and data in Easterly and Levine (1997).17 Second, we showed
that, in the augmented Solow model specification above, the same
pattern obtains in a random effects or SUR panel context, instead of a
single cross section of time averages.
To summarize, these results show that to capture the relevant
cleavages that affect economic growth, focusing only on deep
cleavages is not sufficient. Instead, one needs to take into account
finer distinctions across linguistic groups. This does not imply that
17 In addition, using the Easterly and Levine (1997) setup, the basic pattern holds, or
is even reinforced, when: 1) controlling for political assassinations, 2) controlling for an
W
co
hy
political assassinations plus financial depth, the black market premium, and the fiscal
surplus to GDP ratio, and 3) controlling for all of the above plus the number of coups
d'état, the number of revolutions, a dummy for civil wars and a measure of political
rights (Gastil's index of democracy).gregation: fractionalizationmeasured at low levels of aggregation is
fected by both deep and shallow cleavages. Fractionalization
easured at high levels of aggregation ignores many of the shallower,
t relevant, cleavages, and therefore amounts to a noisy measure to
edict the effect of diversity on growth.
Robustness checks
In this sectionwe conduct a series of robustness checks common to
ch set of dependent variables considered above. The corresponding
onometric estimates are available upon request.
In a first exercise, we examine whether the effects of linguistic
versity might be nonlinear, by adding a quadratic term in diversity
the regressions. Ashraf and Galor (2010) have argued that the
lationship between genetic diversity and development may be
mp shaped: too little or too much diversity may be detrimental to
owth. Consistent with their findings, in the case of growth there is
deed some evidence of such a hump shaped relationship, and
nsistent with our results this is true only at low levels of
gregation. In the case of child mortality there is also a slight
nlinearity, although the overall effect is always negative. For none
the other dependent variables do we find any evidence of a
nlinear relationship. In any case, none of these results change the
sic picture of which levels of aggregation matter most for different
pendent variables.
In a second robustness check, we examine whether the results
ffer between the New World and the Old World. This is important
cause while linguistic cleavages largely reflect historical population
lits of varying degrees of depth, in the New World language
placement may have severed or weakened the link between
guistic cleavages and historic divisions. For instance, in the US
th Blacks and Whites speak English, and in Latin America people of
merindian descent often (though by no means always) speak
ropean languages. Consistent with this fact, when splitting up the
mple into the Old World and the New World defined as the
mericas and Oceania we find the relationship between diversity
d the different dependent variables to be less robust for the New
orld. This may partly reflect the substantially smaller sample of
untries in the New World. An alternative specification to test this
pothesis is to keep the whole sample, but to include a dummy
14
Table 6
Growth and linguistic diversity. (Augmented Solow specification, OLS estimator, 1970–2004 panel).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ELF(1) ELF(6) ELF(15) POL(1) POL(6) POL(15)
ELF (at various levels of aggregation) 0.279 1.056 1.412
[0.933] [0.576]⁎ [0.473]⁎⁎⁎
POL (at various levels of aggregation) 0.205 0.667 0.250
[0.537] [0.531] [0.573]
Log initial real per capita GDP 1.209 1.153 1.143 1.214 1.208 1.203
[0.234]⁎⁎⁎ [0.219]⁎⁎⁎ [0.230]⁎⁎⁎ [0.234]⁎⁎⁎ [0.234]⁎⁎⁎ [0.231]⁎⁎⁎
Investment share of GDP 0.043 0.032 0.032 0.044 0.038 0.043
[0.034] [0.031] [0.031] [0.034] [0.032] [0.034]
Avg. schooling years in total population aged 25+ 0.211 0.193 0.186 0.212 0.233 0.208
[0.098]⁎⁎ [0.092]⁎⁎ [0.095]⁎ [0.097]⁎⁎ [0.095]⁎⁎ [0.096]⁎⁎
Growth of population 0.599 0.524 0.508 0.595 0.526 0.634
[0.196]⁎⁎⁎ [0.204]⁎⁎ [0.184]⁎⁎⁎ [0.198]⁎⁎⁎ [0.214]⁎⁎ [0.194]⁎⁎⁎
Log population 0.197 0.220 0.225 0.197 0.194 0.198
[0.151] [0.147] [0.145] [0.150] [0.150] [0.151]
Interaction between openness and log population 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005
[0.002]⁎⁎ [0.002]⁎⁎ [0.002]⁎⁎ [0.002]⁎⁎ [0.002]⁎⁎ [0.002]⁎⁎
Openness (imports+exports over GDP) 0.046 0.045 0.041 0.046 0.044 0.046
[0.017]⁎⁎⁎ [0.017]⁎⁎ [0.017]⁎⁎ [0.017]⁎⁎⁎ [0.018]⁎⁎ [0.017]⁎⁎⁎
Latin America and Caribbean dummy 0.725 0.990 1.090 0.726 0.909 0.673
[0.309]⁎⁎ [0.289]⁎⁎⁎ [0.278]⁎⁎⁎ [0.306]⁎⁎ [0.286]⁎⁎⁎ [0.311]⁎⁎
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy 1.531 1.656 1.291 1.536 1.585 1.491
[0.528]⁎⁎⁎ [0.542]⁎⁎⁎ [0.516]⁎⁎ [0.529]⁎⁎⁎ [0.523]⁎⁎⁎ [0.526]⁎⁎⁎
East and Southeast Asia dummy 1.329 1.461 1.524 1.316 1.195 1.373
[0.639]⁎⁎ [0.623]⁎⁎ [0.645]⁎⁎ [0.643]⁎⁎ [0.660]⁎ [0.651]⁎⁎
British legal origin dummy 0.286 0.377 0.491 0.291 0.367 0.214
[0.402] [0.415] [0.417] [0.401] [0.418] [0.384]
French legal origin dummy 0.448 0.504 0.557 0.447 0.583 0.407
[0.441] [0.434] [0.439] [0.440] [0.433] [0.388]
Socialist legal origin dummy 0.290 0.312 0.241 0.286 0.401 0.269
[0.439] [0.469] [0.481] [0.440] [0.529] [0.416]
German legal origin dummy 0.066 0.016 0.021 0.070 0.181 0.116
[0.570] [0.565] [0.566] [0.570] [0.609] [0.574]
Constant 8.911 8.623 8.595 8.951 8.889 8.844
[2.410]⁎⁎⁎ [2.336]⁎⁎⁎ [2.347]⁎⁎⁎ [2.421]⁎⁎⁎ [2.391]⁎⁎⁎ [2.389]⁎⁎⁎
R-squared 0.54 0.56 0.57 0.54 0.55 0.54
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
All columns involve 100 countries.
Investment, schooling, population growth, log population and openness are entered as period averages; log initial per capita income is for 1970. The data on income per capita,
income growth, population, population growth, openness and investment are from the PennWorld Tables, version 6.2 (Heston et al., 2006). The data on human capital is from Barro
and Lee (2000). The diversity measures are based on the authors' calculations using the Ethnologue database.
⁎ Significant at 10%.
⁎⁎ Significant at 5%.
⁎⁎⁎ Significant at 1%.
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Fig. 10. Marginal effect of a standard deviation increase in ELF as a % of a standard deviation of growth.
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dodummy and linguistic diversity. When doing so, we find that the
interaction term is not significantly different from zero.
In a third exercise, we run a horserace between measures of
linguistic diversity at various levels of aggregation, by entering levels
j=1, 6, 15 all at once in the regressions. Doing so confirms our results.
In the case of civil conflict and redistribution, only ELF(1) and POL(1)
continue to be statistically significant at the 5% level, with the
measures at lower levels of aggregation being statistically insignifi
cant. In contrast, in the case of growth and public goods the lower
levels of aggregation tend to matter most, except for the case of
illiteracy where diversity measured at an intermediate level of
aggregation is most significant.
In a fourth robustness check, we ran horseraces between
fractionalization and polarization. It is worth pointing out that these
two measures of linguistic diversity tend to be highly correlated,
particularly at very high levels of aggregation (j=1).18 Consistent
with this observation, we find that for outcomes for which diversity at
high levels of aggregation (deep cleavages) matter most (conflict and
redistribution), multicollinearity is severe, and both ELF and POL
become insignificant. In contrast, for outcomes where finer linguistic
disaggregation matters most (growth and public goods) and where
ELF and POL are less collinear, we find that ELF wins out in a horserace
with POL.
Finally, we reran all the regressions using Approach 2 for the
construction of linguistic cleavages (see Fig. 4 and the conceptual
discussion in Section 2.2.2). The results are virtually unchanged. The
reason is straightforward. As discussed in the theoretical section,
Approach 1 and Approach 2 give identical measures of diversity at
both extremes, i.e., for j=1 and j=15. Since in the cases of civil
conflict and redistribution diversity measured at one extreme (the
highest levels of aggregation) matters most and in the cases of public
goods and economic growth diversity measured at the other extreme
(the lowest levels of aggregation) matters most, the results are bound
not to change substantially.
To summarize, these various robustness checks do not modify our
basic result that deep cleavages matter most for conflict and
redistribution, while more superficial linguistic cleavages are suffi
cient to hinder growth and the provision of public goods.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have uncovered new evidence on the relationship
between ethnolinguistic diversity and a range of political economy
outcomes, such as the onset of civil wars, the extent of redistribution,
the provision of public goods, and economic growth. We sought to
identify the relevant linguistic cleavages to explain variation in these
outcomes. We let the data tell us whether deep cleavages, originating
at an earlier time in history, are more or less important than more
superficial cleavages that have arisen more recently. Doing so, we
departed from the common approach relying on arbitrary definitions
of what constitutes a relevant ethnolinguistic group. Our results carry
several lessons. When it comes to civil conflict and redistribution,
deeper cleavages tend to matter more. In contrast, for economic
growth and public goods, we found that diversity measured using
only deep cleavages is not sufficient to predict significant differences
in growth. Instead, measures based on more disaggregated classifica
tions of linguistic groups, capturing finer distinctions between
languages, are important correlates of growth and public goods
provision both in terms of statistical significance and in terms of
economic magnitude.
How should we interpret these results? We have shown that the
type of cultural diversity that matters for outcomes involving
18 Table 2 shows that ELF(1) and POL(1) bear a 0.988 correlation with each other,
falling to 0.555 for ELF(15) and POL(15).e type of diversity that matters for outcomes that entail issues of
ficiency and coordination, such as growth. When it comes to
nflict and redistribution, preferences are of the essence. The
illingness to settle disputes or to transfer resources across a
ltural divide depends on how deep the divide happens to be.
eep cleavages that go back thousands of years appear to be related
ith more conflicts of interest, compared to more superficial
eavages.
In contrast, economic growth requires that groups have the ability
coordinate, interact and organize in networks of production,
owledge and trade. This ability is affected by linguistic divisions. In
dia, for instance, the degree of integration between regions is likely
ndered by linguistic barriers even linguistic barriers separate
latively similar linguistic groups such as Hindi and Gujarati
eakers. Coordination, integration and more generally the ability to
rm knowledge, production and trading networks is hampered as
on as linguistic differentiation prevents interactions between
oups, and this can occur between groups that are relatively similar
guistically.
The case of public goods shares characteristics of both types of
tcomes: public goods are inherently redistributive in nature, and
eir provision depends on differences in preferences among
rticipants. At the same time, the provision of public goods requires
ordination and interactions, that even superficial cleavages might
mper. We found that, much as in the case of growth, for a wide
ray of measures of public goods, fine distinctions between linguistic
oups matter to hinder their provision. Even when cleavages are
allow, a country may fail to have well functioning public services,
t necessarily because people are unwilling to redistribute, but
cause of coordination failures.
Future work should seek to better understand the theoretical
echanisms that account for the contrasting findings between
nflict and redistribution on the one hand, and growth and public
ods on the other hand. In particular, clarifying the differing effects
diversity on efficiency and coordination (where fine distinctions
em to matter more) and preferences (where coarse distinctions
em of the essence) may help account for our results.
Finally, we have focused on linguistic diversity, as a measure of a
oader concept of ethnolinguistic heterogeneity, and even more
oadly as a proxy for cultural diversity. One advantage of focusing
languages is that linguistic distinctions are quite objective: it is
sier to judge whether two populations speak different languages
an to decide whether two populations belong to different
hnicities, a more amorphous concept (precisely for this reason,
hnic categorizations are often based on linguistic divisions,
rticularly for Africa). Another advantage is that data on linguistic
visions, particularly in the form of trees, is more readily available
an data on the genealogical structure of ethnic groups within
untries. There are, however, drawbacks to focusing on languages:
the extent that linguistic divisions are imperfect measures of the
urce of diversity that matters most, this should lead to downward
as on the estimates of the effect of diversity on political economy
tcomes. In principle, the methodology we have developed for
nguistic trees should be applicable to other kinds of differences
tween populations. With advances in population genetics,
opulation phylogenies have become more widely available.
lthough this data is not yet available in a single format such as
e Ethnologue for languages, applying our method to genetic data
uld lead to fruitful advances in the study of the political economy
cultural diversity.
ppendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at
i:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2011.02.003.
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